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3.1  Introduction 
The 1986 Tax Reform Act markedly altered the relative tax burden of cor- 
porations and individuals while also changing the incentives for corporate div- 
idend distributions. Over the period  1987-9 1, corporate tax revenues were 
projected to rise by  $120.3 billion, with individual taxes being reduced by 
$121.9 billion (U.S. House of Representatives 1986, vol. 2, table Al). The 
act also repealed the 60% exclusion previously  afforded capital gains and 
raised the top marginal tax rate from a high of 20% to a high of  33%. At the 
same time the top rate on dividends was cut from 50% to 33%. 
The shift in after-tax income from corporations to individuals combined 
with the increased tax incentive to pay dividends has led some to predict pro- 
found reductions in corporate savings. Since corporate savings typically ac- 
count for over half of private savings, this has prompted concern that aggre- 
gate capital accumulation will be adversely affected. Indeed, a recent Data 
Resources, Inc., publication predicts that: “Private Savings are likely to de- 
cline because of the massive shift of post tax income from businesses to indi- 
viduals . . . over the 1986-91  interval, personal savings are thus expected to 
be only $5 billion higher while corporate savings are $24 billion lower” (Brin- 
ner and Abraham 1986, 17). This quote reflects the conception that the trans- 
fer of  cash from corporations to shareholders will alter real activity, a view 
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consistent with the impression that shareholders do not “pierce the corporate 
veil” and recognize the full implications of the transfer. While the belief that 
transfers from corporations to  individuals will have significant real  effects 
may be commonly held, there is very weak supporting evidence for the prop- 
osition that pure transfer policies have any such effects. 
This paper reexamines the implications of changing corporate savings. We 
begin with the straightforward proposition that the outcome depends crucially 
on the consumption behavior of  shareholders. If, holding  wealth consranf, 
shareholders are perfectly rational and recognize reductions in corporate sav- 
ings as a change in their own asset position, then they will counteract any 
changes in corporate retentions with increased personal savings, leaving pri- 
vate savings unchanged. It is this compensating response to wealth-neutral 
changes in corporate saving that we characterize as “piercing” the corporate 
veil. We  use this simple observation about shareholder savings to develop a 
new test for the existence of the corporate veil. 
The next section discusses the theory behind the corporate veil and argues 
that much of  the previous literature lacked a proper focus. There are several 
reasons why changes in corporate saving might be associated with changes in 
national saving that are entirely consistent with a complete piercing of  the 
corporate veil. Section 3.3 outlines and presents an Euler equation test for the 
existence of the corporate veil. The test supports the hypothesis that no such 
veil exists. Although the test’s power is not strong enough to reject certain 
plausible alternative hypotheses, this finding still casts doubt on previous re- 
sults purporting to demonstrate the existence of a corporate veil. 
Because the Euler equation test is not powerful enough, by itself, to dispose 
entirely of the possible existence of a corporate veil, we  then consider other 
approaches to the question. Using a switching-regressions model of consump- 
tion based on the Euler equation, we  show in section 3.4 that the observed 
significant excess sensitivity of consumption to predictable changes in dispos- 
able income is associated with liquidity constraints rather than myopia or ir- 
rational behavior. This is further evidence against the existence of a corporate 
veil, because such liquidity constraints are almost certain not to apply to con- 
sumption supported by corporate wealth. Section 3.5 uses recent advances in 
the theory of cointegrated processes to shed new light on the time-series prop- 
erties of  consumption behavior and evaluate subtler tests for the presence of 
the corporate veil. A significant finding in this section is that the aggregate 
marginal propensity to consume out of corporate wealth is considerably lower 
than that from other tangible wealth. This could be associated with a corporate 
veil or with marginal consumption propensities differing across households 
according to wealth. Section 3.6  concludes the paper. 
Because the previous literature has often been obscure on this point, it is 
useful to provide at the outset a precise statement of  what a corporate veil 
would do. Our view is that a corporate veil would exist if a shift in the distri- 
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holding his overall wealth constant, affected that individual’s consumption. 
We therefore rule out changes in relative asset values that also affect aggregate 
wealth or the distribution of aggregate wealth among individuals as useful in 
the search for a corporate veil. 
As we shall discuss, tax-induced changes in corporate behavior can affect 
individual consumption behavior without a corporate veil: these policies could 
alter the overall value of  private assets or the distribution of  wealth among 
individuals. 
3.2  The Corporate Veil 
Reductions in corporate savings need not, of course, imply lower aggregate 
private savings. Corporate savings can be thought of as that investment that is 
financed out of retained earnings rather than with new debt or equity. Under 
certain well-specified conditions, this should, as first noted by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1961), be of no consequence to the 
value of  the firm. Any increase in dividends can simply be offset by a com- 
mensurate increase in the firm’s debt or issues of new equity. The Modigliani- 
Miller analysis will hold in general equilibrium, provided that dividend recip- 
ients recognize that their apparent windfall is merely a time reallocation of 
their asset’s dividend stream. Under perfect markets, consumption will not be 
altered, because the consumer’s optimization problem is unchanged. Real be- 
havior will not be affected by a financial version of musical chairs. 
This “dividend irrelevance” view relies upon the shareholder’s ability to 
“pierce the corporate veil”, that  is, to recognize wealth-neutral changes in 
financial policy for what they are. It further requires that shareholders can act 
to  offset  corporate  savings decisions.  If  shareholders were  liquidity  con- 
strained, then an increase in corporate distributions would relax this constraint 
and  increase consumption,  even  with  no  change in perceived  shareholder 
wealth. The case is analogous to consumption increasing without a change in 
human wealth if current labor income increases. However, there are two sig- 
nificant differences between the two cases. First, shareholders can sell stock 
or borrow against it to relax liquidity constraints, while such transactions are 
severely limited with respect to human capital. Second, as we discuss further 
below,  the distribution of share ownership is so concentrated among wealthy 
individuals that the aggregate importance of liquidity constraints within this 
group is implausible. 
If  the value of  the firm increases because of  some underlying change in 
fundamentals, then a significant share of  the concomitant increase in divi- 
dends may  be  consumed because the wealth  or permanent income of  the 
shareholder has increased. If, on the other hand, a firm reduces retained earn- 
ings and increases dividends by one dollar without any underlying change in 
the firm’s real prospects, then, according to the permanent income hypothesis, 
consumption will not change in the absence of taxes because total wealth re- 78  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
mains the same.’ When markets are perfect, financial structure, or, equiva- 
lently, the timing of dividends, should have no effect on real economic behav- 
ior. This distinction is crucial to the proper understanding of  the “corporate 
veil,” and has been  overlooked by  much  of  the previous literature,  which 
seems to interpret consumption responses to fluctuating dividends as evidence 
of a shareholder’s  inability to see through the corporate veil. To the extent that 
changes in  dividends reflect real changes in the value of  the firm, as indeed 
signaling models would suggest, consumption will, of course, change. 
This point lends an interesting perspective to the passage already quoted 
from Brinner and Abraham (1986,  17). There,  the shift in posttax income 
from corporations to individuals,  in the aggregate very  close to a wealth- 
neutral transfer, is predicted to reduce aggregate savings by $19 billion. This 
view suggests that simply carrying wealth across the corporate threshold in- 
duces massive changes in the consumption behavior of shareholders. Since it 
is implausible that liquidity constraints could explain so large a shift in share- 
holders’ consumption, some other force must be perceived as operating here. 
Proponents of this view may simply believe that some fundamental share- 
holder irrationality exists. Alternatively there may be a different experiment 
being implicitly considered, one that does not preserve the initial distribution 
of wealth among individuals. Changes in the distribution of wealth could well 
alter aggregate consumption, but one needs no corporate veil to explain such 
effects.2 A problem one has in interpreting statements relating corporate and 
personal saving is that the experiment being envisioned is not explicitly spec- 
ified. This vagueness has permeated the statistical evidence attempting to re- 
late corporate and personal saving, in effect veiling the corporate veil. 
The modem  empirical study of  corporate saving can be  traced  back  to 
Denison (1958), who found that private saving was much smoother than its 
components, suggesting that personal and corporate saving may  offset each 
other. Feldstein (1973) extended the inquiry by emphasizing that rational con- 
sumers should recognize retained earnings as wealth accruals and consume 
from them.  Using a traditional consumption function, Feldstein found that 
retained earnings were significantly positively correlated with consumption. 
He interpreted this as evidence that consumers pierce the corporate veil. Sub- 
sequent research has come down on both sides of the issue.3 An  example of 
recent work finding evidence of  a corporate veil is Poterba (1987). Poterba 
regressed private saving on several macroeconomic indicators and a dividend 
tax  preference variable. A negative and  significant coefficient on dividend 
taxes was  interpreted as evidence that  consumers do not  completely offset 
changes in corporate saving induced by  tax-related changes in dividend pol- 
icy. A second test using dividend taxes as an instrument for changes in cor- 
porate saving, in an attempt to isolate wealth-neutral changes, found corro- 
borative evidence. Since we have no a priori reason to believe that dividend 
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Reexamination of the empirical methods used in existing studies of corpo- 
rate  saving reveals  many shortcomings. Perhaps most  important, previous 
studies have failed adequately to describe consumer behavior consistent with 
shareholder rationality.  Because of this there has been an improper focus on 
simple changes in dividends or retained earnings, which are certainly corre- 
lated with changes in wealth. The response of consumption to these cannot be 
interpreted as a violation of the permanent income hypothesis and, as such, is 
irrelevant to the investigation of  the existence of a corporate veil. In addition, 
by  neglecting  the  duality of  consumption  and  savings,  some studies have 
needlessly  introduced  problems of  measurement  error as researchers  have 
struggled over proper definitions for personal and private  saving^.^ This focus 
on saving has also divorced the inquiry from breakthroughs  in the study of 
consumer behavior and rational expectations which, as we shall illustrate, are 
particularly useful here. 
Another problem  with  some previous  research  is from  an econometric 
viewpoint. Results typically  based  on regressions  using levels of aggregate 
time series are difficult to interpret because of underlying nonstationarity and 
the well-known  accompanying spurious regression  difficultie~.~  Significant 
correlation between corporate retained  earnings or dividends  and consump- 
tion may simply reflect common trends in the data. 
In the following sections we illustrate that all of these shortcomings can be 
addressed  through a straightforward  application of the modem theory of the 
rational consumer. We test two related propositions implied by the absence of 
a corporate veil; first, that changes in dividend policy that are anticipated, and 
hence provide no new information to shareholders in estimating their wealth, 
do not affect aggregate consumption; second, that the response of changes in 
consumption to changes in different forms of wealth (corporate vs. noncorpor- 
ate) are equal. Each test is based on the idea that, in the absence of a corporate 
veil, a shift in wealth should not affect consumption. 
3.3  Euler Equations and the Corporate Veil 
3.3.1  Rational Expectations and the Theory of the Consumer 
Assuming a constant real  interest  rate and quadratic utility,  Hall  (1978) 
showed  that  one  implication  of  the  permanent  income hypothesis is  that 
consumption follows a  random  walk.  If  rational  agents maximize a time- 
separable function  of  consumption, then all currently  available information 
will already be included in current consumption. Hence, current consumption 
should provide the best available forecast of future consumption. Subsequent 
generalizations have allowed for interest rates to change over time. 
Following the previous literature (e.g., Grossman and Shiller 198  1; Hansen 
and Singleton 1983),  consider a representative agent seeking to maximize the 80  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
expected utility of consumption. If  this consumer has a CES utility function 
with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution a and a pure rate of time pref- 
erence 6, then his optimal consumption path will obey the Euler equation: 
where r, is the after-tax rate of  return to savings. Equation (1) may also be 
written: 
where E, is a stochastic term with conditional mean zero at time t -  1. Taking 
logs of both sides of (2), and imposing the approximation that In( 1 + x) =  x, 
for x small, one obtains 
(3)  Ac,  =  -US  + ar, + UE,, 
where Ac,  = In  C,  -  In C,-,.  Since r, and E,  are potentially correlated, it is 
useful to decompose r, into an expected component rg  uncorrelated with  E, 
and a “surprise” term r, -  r;,  to obtain an estimable equation? 
Act = -a6  + ar; + u(q + r, - r;)  (4) 
= k + urg  + e,. 
Much recent debate has focused on the observation of  Flavin (1981) that 
consumption seems excessively sensitive to anticipated changes in  income, 
which have a positive and significant effect when included in  equation (1). 
Interpretations of this positive coefficient have emphasized the idea that some 
fraction of consumers face liquidity constraints and consume their income in 
each period. To aid in this interpretation, Campbell and Mankiw (1987) con- 
sider a general model where A individuals are liquidity constrained, “Keynes- 
ian” consumers, and (1 -  A) individuals obey the permanent income hypoth- 
esis. In  this case, if  Ay;  is defined to be the expected current change in the 
logarithm of  income of the liquidity-constrained group, equation (4) can be 
rewritten: 
(5)  Act = AAy;  + (1 - A)[k  + crrg  + e,] 
= p.’  + u’r; + XAy;  + e:. 
The implications of the permanent income hypothesis are straightforward 
in  this context.  Invoking rational expectations, that  is, instrumenting with 
variables in the information set at the beginning of period t, should yield an 
estimate of  A insignificantly different from zero. Noting that, as first pointed 
out by  Working  (1960), time aggregation could induce an  MA( 1) error in 
equation (2),  making period  t - 1 variables inadmissible as  instruments, 
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estimates of A ranging from .413 to .668. They conclude that roughly 50% of 
income is held by consumers who face liquidity constraints. 
Similar reasoning can be applied to consumers as stockholders. Predictable 
changes in dividends, already in the current information set, should be incor- 
porated into consumption plans. Thus, expected dividends should affect only 
the consumption of  the liquidity constrained. If  we  divide the income of 
liquidity-constrained households, Y,, into dividend income D,  and all other 
income Y,*, then, in  logarithms, Ay,  = (1 -y)Ay,*  + ?Ad,,  where y is the 
proportion  of  total  income that  dividends represent for these  households. 
Thus, equation (5) may be rewritten: 
(6)  Ac,  = p,'  + dr-;  + A,y,*e + A,Ae  + e;, 
where A, = A(1 -y) and A,  = Ay. 
The notion that liquidity constraints can be significant in explaining con- 
sumption out of expected dividends is, as we suggested earlier, difficult to 
support. Put simply, y must be very small. Row  1 of table 3.1, taken from the 
1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, gives estimates of the proportion of cor- 
porate equities held by individuals in different strata of  the income distribu- 
ti~n.~  Our measure of  income includes all money  income received by  the 
members of the sample in  1982. Notably, nearly all stock ownership is by 
those individuals at the top of the income distribution, with almost 78% of all 
corporate wealth held by the top 5% of the income distribution. In addition, 
as mentioned before, if  stockholders did face constraints they could easily 
relax them by selling their stock. 
Absent liquidity constraints, the  coefficient on  expected  dividends,  A,, 
should be zero unless the corporate veil exists. Since expected changes in 
dividends are already included in agents' current inferences about their asset 
positions, they should not affect consumption.8  This is true regardless of the 
tax treatment of those dividends and whatever the process is that drives divi- 
dend changes. The coefficient on dividends, A,,  measures the response of con- 
sumption to perceived wealth-neutral changes in dividends. If there is a cor- 
porate veil, this will be positive and significant. 
As a final extension of the Euler equation approach we will further decom- 
pose disposable income into components attributable to capital and  labor, 
keeping dividends separate. This will aid in the interpretation of excess sen- 
Table 3.1  Percentage of Total Wealth Held by Different Income Classes (taken 
from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances) 
Income Class (percentile) 
~~ 
0-10  10-25  25-50  50-75  75-90  90-95  95-100 
% Corporate wealth  ,263  ,385  2.511  4.396  7.919  6.866  77.661 
% Other wealth  2.108  4.309  10.185  16.192  16.056  10.428  40.722 82  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
sitivity as liquidity constraints in the form of  an individual’s inability to bor- 
row against future labor income. The equation we estimate is: 
(7)  hc, = p’  + cr’r; + A,Ayl: + A,Ayk:  + A,A&  + el 
To  guard against a possible aggregation-induced first-order moving average 
error term, we can estimate this equation using doubly lagged instrumental 
 variable^.^ 
3.3.2  The Data 
For our estimation we use quarterly and annual data from 1948-85  taken 
from the Citibase dataset. For consumption, we use aggregate consumption of 
nondurables and services. Our interest rate variable is the average six-month 
Treasury-bill rate for the quarter less the inflation rate based on the implicit 
price deflator for nondurable consumption.  lo Income is defined as aggregate 
disposable income and excludes after-tax dividends when these are included 
in the Euler equation. After-tax aggregate labor income, capital income, and 
dividends are constructed in a manner similar to that used  by  Blinder and 
Deaton (1985). Variables are converted to real values with the aggregate defla- 
tor for nondurable consumption. Every variable but the interest rate is in logs 
and per capita. Further discussion of the construction of our variables is avail- 
able in the data appendix below. 
3.3.3  Results 
We  review first the results from our quarterly regressions. As a starting 
point, our estimation of equation (5) is reported in table 3.2, which reports 
the instrumental variable results based upon an instrument set that includes 
second, third, and fourth lags of consumption and income; the second lag of 
the six-month Treasury-bill rate; and second, third, and fourth lags of pretax 
corporate profits and the after-tax return to shareholders of a dollar distributed 
versus a dollar retained, taken from Poterba (1987).” Our finding of a cr insig- 
nificantly different from zero agrees with results reported in Hall (1988) and 
Campbell and Mankiw  (1987). Our estimate of  A  of  .431 is very  close to 
Campbell and Mankiw’s reported estimates, which range from .413 to .668. 
The accompanying t-statistic is 3.56, implying that there is clear excess sen- 
sitivity of consumption to expected changes in disposable income. 
The estimates of equation (6) are reported in the second row of table 3.2. 
We use the same set of instruments but include three lags of dividend changes, 
starting with the second lag. Again, our estimate of  cr is insignificantly differ- 
ent from zero. Our estimate of  A, decreases slightly to .378 but is again statis- 
tically significant. The estimate of  A,,  our measure of the corporate veil, is 
slightly positive but insignificantly different from zero, indicating that con- 
sumption is not excessively sensitive to dividends. 
Equation (7), a further generalization of  the Euler equation, is reported in 
the third row of  table 3.2. Again, second, third, and fourth lags of the differ- 83  Corporate Savings and Shareholder Consumption 
Table 3.2  Euler Equation Estimates (t-statistics in parentheses); Dependent 
Variable = Log-differenced  Consumption (quarterly, 1947: 1-1986:l) 
Equation  Constant  Aye  <  Adiv;  AYyk:  AYt 
(5)  ,002  4.31  -  ,002 
(3.01)  (3.56)  (.137) 
D-W = 2.34, Rz = .I  11, R2 = ,093 
... 
(6)  ,003  ,378  -  .010  ,065 
(3.20)  (2.89)  (- ,503)  (1.16) 
D-W = 2.39, R2 = .121, R2 = ,095 
(7)  ,004  . . .  -  ,058  ,056  -  .085  ,458 
(4.15)  (- 2.45)  (1.17)  (-1.09)  (3.67) 
D-W  = 2.21, R2 = ,177,  R2 = ,145 
Nore:  All variables,  except the real  interest  rate, are  expressed as differences of  the  logs of 
population-deflated variables. 
enced variables and the second lag of the interest rate are used as instruments. 
Here, disposable income is broken down into its labor and capital compo- 
nents. The estimate of XI,  interpretable as the proportion of labor income held 
by those who are liquidity constrained, is a statistically significant .458. Both 
coefficients on capital income are insignificantly different from zero, with the 
coefficient on nondividend capital income equal to -  .085. 
The annual results in table 3.3 use the same specification, but are based on 
instrument sets including once-lagged variables. We  include such instruments 
because some variables are quite hard to predict using instruments lagged at 
least two years; our test of a corporate veil has little power unless a reasonable 
prediction of future dividend changes is possible. 
In  comparing equations (347) in table 3.3 to those in table 3.2, we  see 
few qualitative differences. The coefficients on disposable income are some- 
what higher and those on dividends somewhat lower, but the conclusions are 
basically the same. 
We  have estimated these equations using different measures of the interest 
rate, different sets of instruments, different deflators, and different measures 
of  consumption. In every case, we  obtained results of  a similar nature: we 
have found no evidence that consumption is excessively sensitive to changes 
in dividends, that is, no evidence of  the existence of  the corporate veil. In 
each case, the error is serially uncorrelated, making the standard error esti- 
mates used to calculate the reported t-statistics admissible.13  All of  the vari- 
ables used in the estimation are difference stationary, so no problems of spu- 
rious regression are present. 
How conclusive are these results concerning the existence of the corporate 
veil? The insignificance of the predicted changes in dividends is an important 
finding in light of previous claims to have “proved” the corporate veil’s exis- 84  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
Table 3.3  Euler Equation Estimates (t-statistics in parentheses); Dependent 
Variable = Log-differenced Consumption (annual, 1947-85) 
Equation  Constant  Aye  I:  Adiv;  AYyk:  AYC 
(5)  .005  .472  -  ,017  ...  ...  ... 
(2.39)  (5.42)  (- .284) 
D-W  = 2.21, R2 = ,576, R2 = ,537 
(6)  .00s  .554  -  ,030  ,022  ...  ... 
(2.414)  (4.888)  (- ,453)  (.463) 
D-W = 2.28, R2 = .586, R2 = .527 
(7)  ,011  ...  -  ,152  ,025  ,012  ,492 
D-W = 2.36, R2 = .693, R2 = ,631 
(2.229)  ( -  2.95  1)  (.555)  (.169)  (4.832) 
tence. The fact that predicted disposable labor income is consistently highly 
significant in these regressions while being no easier to predict shows that the 
insignificance of dividends is not due simply to the use of poor instruments.14 
Yet, one must recognize that the results in tables 3.2 and 3.3 are not pow- 
erful enough to reject all alternative hypotheses corresponding to the corpo- 
rate veil. For example, under the alternative hypothesis that the same fractions 
of dividend income and labor income accrued to households facing liquidity 
constraints and having a marginal propensity to consume current income of 
unity, we would expect the coefficient on expected dividends, A*, to equal the 
fraction of consumption accounted for by  such households, A, multiplied by 
the ratio of  dividends to disposable income. Since this ratio is of  the same 
order of  magnitude as the coefficients of  predicted dividends, we  would be 
unable to reject the alternative hypothesis. We  have already suggested, how- 
ever, that there are fundamental inconsistencies with an alternative hypothesis 
based on liquidity constraints. The only plausible alternative must invoke my- 
opia or irrationality to explain excess sensitivity. Thus, it is important to de- 
termine the source of  the documented excess sensitivity of  consumption to 
predictable changes in labor income. Unless a source compatible with the cor- 
porate veil is found, the results will support our conclusion against the veil's 
existence. 
3.4  Credit Crises as Switching Regressions 
As we have noted, there is more than one interpretation of the above result 
that consumption is excessively sensitive to changes in income. In this section 
we provide further evidence, based on a Markov switching model, that this 
excess sensitivity does indeed reflect the impact of  liquidity constraints. We 
find that excess sensitivity has been episodic and confined to a relatively small 
number of postwar years, typically during recessions and/or credit crises. 85  Corporate Savings and Shareholder Consumption 
In their concluding remarks, Campbell and Mankiw remark that the viola- 
tion of the Euler equation is only a recent phenomenon. “The evidence against 
the permanent income model comes primarily from the second half of  our 
sample period,  1969-85”  (1987, 32). Since a portion of this period is one of 
increased national debt and higher real interest rates, it is not inconceivable 
that borrowing behavior somehow changed after 1969, but testing this is not 
straightforward, because, as Neftci (1984) noted, arbitrarily splitting data and 
testing for parameter differences may bias results in favor of finding multiple 
parameter regimes. This observation suggests an alternative specification of 
the model of the consumer: we consider a model where all consumers con- 
sume according to the permanent income hypothesis, except for occasional 
surprise episodes of nonoptimal consumption caused by economywide “credit 
crises.” Specifically, we estimate the following switching model: 
Acf  = c~,r;,  + X,Ay:  + e, 
Acir = ACE 
= Ac; 
if  i = 1 
if  i = 2, 
where cir  is the logarithm of observed consumption, 5 is the expected interest 
rate, Ay;‘  is the expected change in the logarithm income, and ei, are indepen- 
dent, normally distributed errors. If  liquidity constraints only appear occa- 
sionally, there will be two distinct states.  l5 The liquidity-constrained state will 
have  a  large,  positive,  and  significant coefficient on  income.  The uncon- 
strained state will look like the random walk predicted by  the permanent in- 
come hypothesis. Following Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) we model the tran- 
sition from state 1 to state 2 as a first-order Markov process. 
Even with the simplifying Markov assumption, the likelihood function for 
this model is quite cumbersome, since the likelihood of each possible “trajec- 
tory” through the data must be investigated. At  first glance, this seems to 
require the summation of 2‘ terms in the calculation of the likelihood, some- 
thing infeasible even in small samples. But, as Coslett and Lee (1985) have 
shown, the likelihood function can be rewritten using a recursive relation that 
takes  advantage of  the  assumed Markov  structure and greatly reduces the 
computational burden.  l6  Even with this simplification, the model is a difficult 
nonlinear estimation problem, with the usual accompanying problem of pos- 
sible local maxima and minima. To estimate the model we use the same data 
used in the above Euler  equation^,^' but in this case we use only annual data 
since our earlier results suggests that time aggregation will not alter the results 
significantly and the use of annual data further reduces the required computa- 
tion time. Since our analysis is only meant to be suggestive of the benefits of 
this approach, we further simplify by approximating the expected interest rate 
with the actual lagged interest rate, and expected income with lagged income, 
rather than using instrumental variables. The Davidson-Fletcher-Powell non- 
linear search algorithm was used to find the optimum. Since the likelihood 
function is very nonlinear, and may have numerous local maxima, different 86  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
starting  values  were  tried  in order to assure  that  the  maximum  attained  is 
global. Finally, the Coslett-Lee algorithm was started up by assigning the ini- 
tial probability of being in each state its unconditional value.'8 The estimated 
matrix of second derivatives is used to construct the standard errors. 
The results of  the parameter estimation are reported in table 3.4. We find 
clear evidence of multiple regimes.  In regime  1, the unconstrained regime, 
our estimate of u is a statistically insignificant .047. The estimate of the coef- 
ficient on lagged changes in income is -  .023, which  is also insignificant. 
Sensitivity to the interest rate is slightly higher in the second regime, with a u 
estimate of  .082, but this coefficient is, given its standard error, still insignifi- 
cantly  different  from zero. The liquidity constraint estimate  for the  second 
regime is ,526. The accompanying t-statistic of 6.07 is significant at the .999 
level of confidence. These estimates mesh quite well with previous estimates 
of the model's parameters, suggesting that our alternative nonlinear (because 
of the interaction of  the switching model and the linear consumption model) 
specification and our simplifying assumptions are reasonable. The estimated 
transition matrix and the accompanying t-statistics are also given in table 3.4. 
Both  regimes  are significantly  persistent.  The probability  of  the  economy 
being in the unconstrained state, given that it was unconstrained yesterday is 
.90. The probability of moving from a constrained state to a constrained state 
is .74. These values imply an unconditional probability of being in the con- 
strained state of only .28. 
To gain further insight into the nature of the two regimes, we calculate the 
conditional  inference  of  the  probability  that the current  year  is in the con- 
strained regime. The calculation of these probabilities follows the observation 
of Hamilton (1989), that time t information can be combined with our infer- 
ence about the Markov probabilities to construct the best estimate of the state 
of  the world at time  t, conditional  on our best guess about the state of the 
world at t - 1. For example, if the probability of being in each state at time t 
- 1 is .5, and the transition probabilities are also .5, then the conditional 
probability of being in state  1 at time t is simply the proportion of the total 
likelihood attributable to that state. If  the Markov probabilities are different 
from .5, then the likelihoods are reweighed to account for the Markovian in- 
Table 3.4  Maximum-Likelihood Estimation of Switching Regimes Model: 
Dependent Variable Is Log Change of Consumption (t-statistics are in 
parentheses) 
r,  AY,-  I  u,  p,, 
State 1  .047  -  ,023  1.079  .896 
(.60)  (- .27)  (7.52)  (2.28) 
State 2  .082  ,526  .510  ,743 
(1.18)  (6.07)  (3.87)  (2.04) 
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formation about the likelihood of each path through the data. If, for example, 
we  have a strong inference that yesterday was in regime 1, and the Markov 
probability of remaining in state 1 is very high, than we might classify today 
as regime 1, even if the state-2 model appeared to fit the current observation 
better. Starting at time zero, a chain of  successive inferences can be used to 
estimate the most likely trajectory taken through the two underlying models. 
Table 3.5 contains the conditional state probability for each year. The prob- 
Table 3.5  Conditional Probability of Being in the Constrained State 
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ability estimates are in accordance with the view, expressed by Campbell and 
Mankiw, that liquidity constraints first emerged in that late 1960s. However, 
if we label a year a “credit crisis year” if  the probability of being in the con- 
strained regime is greater than .5, then the first constrained year is 1966, not 
1969, with the probability of being in the constrained regime being quite low 
before that and for sustained periods after 1970 as well. After 1966, the econ- 
omy switches periodically from a constrained to unconstrained regime. Over- 
all, only  10 years in our sample are in the constrained regime. Table 3.5, 
column 4, lists an alternative measure of credit tightness, the differential be- 
tween the average and prime lending rates. On average, this is much larger 
during the “credit crunch’ periods providing further indication that the credit 
crisis interpretation of liquidity constraints is valid.  l9 
3.5  A Time-Series Investigation of Consumption from Assets 
3.5.1  The Consumption Function and Cointegration 
In section 3.2 we showed that one implication of the piercing of the corpo- 
rate  veil  is that  wealth-neutral dividend changes should have no  effect on 
consumption. Our findings in section 3.3 confirmed the absence of any such 
effect. In section 3.4, we supported the plausibility of this result by  demon- 
strating that the observed sensitivity of consumption to other forms of current 
income than dividends is attributable to liquidity constraints, which are very 
unlikely to apply to corporate shareholders. 
This section considers another implication of  shareholders’ piercing the 
corporate veil. We  focus our attention on a question that was not easily ad- 
dressed with our previous methodology: Is the marginal propensity to con- 
sume out of corporate wealth as high as the marginal propensity to consume 
out of other forms of wealth? A lower propensity to consume out of corporate 
wealth would imply a permanent increase in consumption as a result of a shift 
in resources from corporations to individuals. This heterogeneity of response 
could be seen as evidence of a subtler form of corporate veil than we consid- 
ered above. Our previous test found that a change in the portion of existing 
wealth held in corporate form does not affect consumption.Our new tests ad- 
dress  whether the  composition of  changes  in  wealth  affect  consumption. 
While such differences would be consistent with the presence of  a corporate 
veil, there is at least one other potential explanation. Given the wealth distri- 
bution statistics reported in table 3.1, a lower aggregate marginal propensity 
to consume out of corporate wealth would be consistent with a marginal pro- 
pensity to consume declining with the overall level of wealth. In such a case, 
a wealth-neutral transfer from corporations to individuals would increase con- 
sumption via distributional effects, not because of an effective corporate veil. 
This possibility is discussed further below. 
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ings to this point. For example, shareholders could understand and compen- 
sate for changes in dividend policy while at the same time being more reluc- 
tant to raise their consumption to respond to increases in  share prices. This 
reluctance could be attributable to a lack of faith in efficient markets, for ex- 
ample, a belief that a market that had risen might be above its “true” value. 
This distinction helps to clarify the alternative possible sources of a corpo- 
rate veil. We  have already dismissed the idea that shareholders are afflicted by 
the “bird-in-the-hand” fallacy, that a dollar distributed by corporations is in- 
trinsically more valuable once in  their hands (holding taxes and other real 
differences constant). However, dividend policy is but one very simply mech- 
anism by which corporate share values could change. Shareholders might be 
reluctant to respond to other changes in corporate wealth, as just suggested. 
Alternatively, they might respond as we  predict to changes in  shareholder 
wealth, but the change in the market valuation of  corporate shares may not 
accurately reflect “true” changes in corporate values. In either case, a corpo- 
rate veil could exist, although by  focusing on  responses to changes in the 
market value of corporate wealth we do not consider the latter case. 
To  effect these alternative tests of  the impact of corporate wealth on con- 
sumption, we take advantage of  recent results concerning cointegrated time 
series. 
One implication of the permanent income hypothesis is that, holding inter- 
est rates constant, consumption is a constant fraction of wealth. The concept 
of wealth, of course, is total wealth, and includes the present discounted value 
of  returns to human capital, human wealth. According to the theory, there 
should be an equilibrium relationship between consumption and assets, or, in 
the terminology of Engle and Granger (1987), consumption and assets should 
be cointegrated.20  The error term from the equation 
(9)  C, = P(A, + H,)  + e,, 
where H,  is human wealth, should be stationary. Any deviation from the long- 
run equilibrium relationship is stationary and short-lived. If  current income 
affects consumption, and is itself not stationary, then the error term in equa- 
tion (9) will not be stationary. Rather, the equilibrium relationship will be of 
the form: 
that is, consumption will be cointegrated with assets and income. If  interest 
rates matter, p,  will change over time, and there need be no cointegrating re- 
lationship between consumption and assets. 
We examine the relevance of the additional explanation  of the corporate veil 
mentioned at the beginning of  this section by  estimating consumption func- 
tions similar to equations (9) and (10). If wealth is decomposed into its cor- 
porate, human, and noncorporate components, then we can relax the assump- 
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If we difference equation (10) we obtain: 
(1 1)  AC,  = p(AA, + AH,) + XAY, + el -  el-,. 
The presence of  el-, could lead to inconsistent estimates because it is corre- 
lated with the explanatory variables. An alternative approach, if consumption, 
assets, and income are cointegrated, is to substitute the lagged estimate of the 
error from equation (10) as a proxy for el-,  . In this “error-correction” model, 
we can also obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients on assets because 
the remaining error is orthogonal to the beginning-of-period explanatory var- 
iables.22  For continuity, we  exclude after-tax dividends from disposable in- 
come and include these separately in the regression. Notice that in these re- 
gressions, the coefficients on dividends no longer reflects simply the existence 
of a corporate veil. Actual current dividends are likely to include new infor- 
mation about future income and hence current wealth as well. The same is 
true of  actual disposable income. However, our focus in this section is not on 
these coefficients, and the wealth coefficients should not  be  affected, since 
consumption responses to new  information are assumed to be orthogonal to 
beginning-of-period wealth. 
3.5.2  The Data 
We  construct our financial asset measure from the quarterly Flow of Funds 
tables supplied by the Board of Governors of  the Federal Reserve Bank.z3 
Noncorporate wealth includes total financial assets net of  corporate equities 
and owner-occupied housing. From this we subtract total liabilities net of in- 
stallment consumer credit. This is consistent with our exclusion of  durables 
from our consumption measure, which is the same as that used in previous 
sections. Beginning-of-period values are used for all wealth variables. Cor- 
porate wealth is item 26 in the flow of funds table, “corporate equities.” Our 
measure of human wealth is the present discounted value of  future expected 
after-tax labor earnings, calculated as a rolling forecast. These earnings are 
discounted at the arbitrary rate of .015.  24 Specification tests indicated that this 
assumption was not crucial to the results. The time period considered is 1952- 
85.25  Preliminary testing indicated that all of the variables used are difference 
stationary. 
3.5.3  Results 
Table 3.6, row  1, gives the result of  the estimation of equation (6) using 
quarterly data, splitting off  corporate equities, and not imposing equality of 
wealth  coefficients.  The  coefficients on  human  wealth  and  noncorporate 
wealth are very similar, but the coefficient on corporate wealth is small and 
negative. The test for cointegration is essentially a test for the nonstationarity 
of the error term, that is, in the simplest case, a test of the null hypothesis the 
errors are first-order autocorrelated with a unit root. Following Sargan and 
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Table 3.6  Estimates of Consumption from Wealth in Levels and Differences 
(I-statistics  in parentheses): Dependent variable = Quarterly 
Consumption 
Human  Noncorporate  Corporate 
Constant  Wealth  Wealth  Wealth  YD  DIV 
1. Quarterly levels: 
,014  .loo  ,109  -  ,016 
(.351)  (29.2)  (18.3)  (-4.31) 
D-W  = ,316, R2  = .99, Dickey-Fuller  = -2.75,  Adjusted Dickey-Fuller = -3.06 
2. Quarterly levels: 
,286  ,044  ,067  -  ,001  ,358  ,307 
(8.55)  (9.46)  (1  2.55)  (- ,319)  (  13.65)  (.905) 
D-W  = ,646, R* = .99, Dickey-Fuller = -4.56,  Adjusted Dickey-Fuller = -4.51 
3. Quarterly differences: 
,019  ,007  ,027  ,006  .243  1.56 
(3.56)  (  .302)  (1.91)  (1.24)  (6.57)  (2.90) 
D-W  = 1.82, R2  = .49, error correction parameter = -  ,161 ( -  2.07) 
Durbin-Watson statistic is a very low .316, which is close to the 5% critical 
value of  the test of  .28.26  Since the relevant critical value depends upon the 
data used, this can only be interpreted as weak evidence of cointegration. Two 
further tests of cointegration shed more light on the issue. The Dickey-Fuller 
and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reported in table 3.6, row  1, both accept 
noncointegration of assets and consumption. Row 2 of  table 3.6 presents an 
estimate of this model with disposable income and dividends included. The 
coefficients on noncorporate assets and human wealth are somewhat smaller 
and more plausible. The coefficient on corporate equities is again small and 
negative. The inclusion of  these variables has increased the Durbin-Watson 
statistic to .65,27  leading to a clear conclusion that these variables are cointe- 
grated. The Dickey Fuller and  augmented Dickey Fuller tests both  accept 
cointegration at the 10% significant level. (The 10% critical values from Engle 
and Yoo, 1987, are 4.26 and 4.06, respectively). Row 3 contains the estimates 
of the differenced error correction model. One lag of the error correction term 
is reported since no further lags were found to be  significant in  this speci- 
fication. With  the  exception of  the  coefficients on  corporate equities and 
dividends,  the  coefficients are  all  smaller.  The large drop in  the  human 
wealth coefficient may well reflect the noisiness of our imputation method (see 
note 21). 
Table 3.7 presents results for the same model using annual data. These re- 
sults are quite similar to those based on quarterly data.2s  The pure life-cycle 
model rejects cointegration, and the inclusion of income leads to the accept- 
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Table 3.7  Estimates of Consumption from Wealth in Levels and Differences 
(t-statistics  in parentheses): Dependent Variable = Annual 
Consumption 
Human  Noncorporate  Corporate 
Constant  Wealth  Wealth  Wealth  YD  DIV 
1. Annual levels: 
-  ,042  ,105  ,104  -  ,017  ...  ... 
(.092)  (  14.29)  (7.99)  (- 2.03)  ...  ... 
D-W = .95, R2 = .99, Dickey-Fuller = -  2.44, Adjusted Dickey Fuller = -  2.73 
2. Annual levels: 
,286  ,039  .054  -  .005  .412  ,817 
(3.73)  (3.64)  (4.70)  (-,698)  (6.87)  (1.09) 
D-W  = 1.32,  R* = .99, Dickey-Fuller  = 3.43, Adjusted Dickey-Fuller =  -4.08 
3. Annual differences 
.034  -  ,007  ,039  ,009  ,412  .938 
(1.46)  ( -  ,260)  (1.89)  (1.25)  (5.94)  (.438) 
D-W = 1.929,  R2 = .86, error correction parameter = -  .813( -  3.19) 
The most startling conclusion in both sets of regressions is that the aggre- 
gate marginal consumption out of corporate equities is so close to zero.3o  As 
already suggested, this could simply be a reflection of  a declining marginal 
propensity to consume as wealth increases, combined with the high position 
in  the  income distribution  of  shareholders.  The  distribution of  corporate 
wealth is indeed more skewed than that of  noncorporate wealth. Row  2 of 
table 3.1, again, taken from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, shows 
the percentage of noncorporate wealth held by different strata of  the income 
distribution. Contrasting this with the distribution of  corporate equities de- 
picted in row 1, it is clear that the distribution of noncorporate wealth is more 
equal, especially in the top brackets. Strong evidence of a declining marginal 
propensity to consume out-of-asset wealth is supplied in  Hoyt (1988), who 
shows that differences in the ratio of wealth to permanent income across in- 
come classes grow dramatically over the life-cycle. Hoyt concludes that this 
indicates a much higher saving propensity among the wealthy. Other evidence 
of different propensities to consume across the income distribution is supplied 
in Drobny and Hall (1987), who use a relative tax variable to identify distri- 
butional effects in an aggregate consumption function. They find that the mar- 
ginal propensity to consume is much higher among low-rate, that  is, low- 
income, taxpayers.  31 
Given the existing evidence of  differing propensities to consume among 
income classes,  combined with  the right-skewed distribution of  corporate 
wealth, one may explain the very low observed coefficient on corporate wealth 
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explanation is entirely consistent with our rejection of  the corporate veil in 
section 3.2, because the previous experiment of altering dividend policy holds 
constant the distribution of  wealth across the population, while the current 
approach need not. Nevertheless, even without a corporate veil, such a low 
coefficient could still imply important consumption effects of shifts in the dis- 
tribution of  income away from corporate shareholders. However such dis- 
tributional effects have little to do with the separate existence of corporate 
entities and depend very much on the particular policy experiment being en- 
visaged. 
3.6  Conclusion 
This paper has used the modem theory of the consumer to devise a new test 
for the existence of the corporate veil. We  find evidence that consumption is 
not excessively sensitive to fluctuations in dividends, reconfirming the view 
that shareholders successfully pierce the corporate veil. This finding is corrob- 
orated by other results suggesting that the significant excess sensitivity of cur- 
rent consumption to other forms of income is due to liquidity constraints that, 
unlike irrationality and myopia, cannot plausibly be associated with consump- 
tion from corporate equity wealth. 
We  find very little consumption from corporate assets in our consumption 
functions. Thisicould be interpreted as evidence for a corporate veil. However, 
one may also explain this as representing the presumably very low propensity 
to consume of shareholders, 77% of whom are in the top 5% of the income 
distribution. For many purposes, this distinction could be important. Future 
research, perhaps using panel data to isolate differences in propensity to con- 
sume from various assets, should examine these distributional issues more 
closely. 
Data Appendix 
The variables used in our analysis are constructed as follows (all variables not 
taken from the Flow of Funds [FOF] tables are taken from the NIPA section 
of the Citibase dataset): 
1. Consumption is personal consumption expenditures on nondurables and 
services. 
2. Disposable income is broken down into its capital and labor components 
by assigning proprietors’ income and personal income taxes to each according 
to its factor share. Dividends are also converted to after-tax values in this way. 
Capital income includes interest payments. Labor income also includes wages 
and salaries, other labor income, and transfer payments. 
3. Human wealth is the present discounted value of all future labor income 94  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
(as defined above) and is calculated  as a simple univariate forecast of  labor 
income. This forecast is constructed by first regressing  full-sample labor in- 
come on a constant and a trend, subtracting these, then performing an eight- 
lag VAR  on the detrended series. These VAR  coefficients  are then used  to 
forecast labor income given period t information, then the constant and trend 
are added back in. 
4. Corporate wealth is item 26 of the FOF sector balance sheets for house- 
holds. As there is a separate entry for pension fund reserves (item 30), our 
variable excludes equities held by pension funds. Such pension assets are in- 
cluded in our measure of noncorporate wealth. 
5. Noncorporate  wealth is also taken from the FOF sector balance  sheets 
for households. It equals owner-occupied housing (item 4) plus total financial 
assets (item  1  I), less corporate equities (item 26), and total liabilities net of 
installment consumer credit (item 35  minus item 40). We exclude installment 
consumer credit and consumer durables for consistency with our consumption 
definition, which excludes durables. 
6. The interest rates used are quarterly averages of  the six-month and three- 
month Treasury-bill rates. 
Notes 
1.  Even with dividend taxes present, consumption should change only to the extent 
that the  dividend payment  reduces the shareholder’s wealth.  This effect should be 
small, and under the “new view” of corporate equity valuation (Auerbach 1979) should 
be  nonexistent.  In  any event, since the tests derived below examine the effects on 
consumption of  changes in dividend policy, holding wealth constant, any effects on 
wealth of pure financial policy associated with taxes will be purged from the estimated 
consumption response. 
2. Another possible channel  for increased consumption effects would be wealth- 
induced changes associated with the shift in the tax burden. While there is a plausible 
theoretical argument that the provisions of the 1986 act should have increased the value 
of  corporate  shares (Auerbach  1989), this does not  seem to be the mechanism the 
authors have in mind. However, this ambiguity highlights the problem in identifying 
the source of the perceived impact on consumption. 
3. For further evidence of the existence of the corporate veil see Bhatia (1979) or 
Hendershott and Peek (1987). For recent evidence against the corporate veil see von 
Furstenburg (1981). 
4.  Indeed, corporate savings is extremely difficult to define. For example, an in- 
crease in share repurchases and reduction in dividends appears as an increase in cor- 
porate savings and a concomitant decline in personal savings. 
5. See Phillips (1986) for a recent discussion of spurious regressions. 
6. Several issues arise in considering whether it is acceptable to apply such “repre- 
sentative  agent” equations to aggregate  time-series  data.  Several authors have  ad- 
dressed these questions in the past with no clearly preferable alternative resulting. We 
do not claim exception from the usual criticisms, but neither do we view the current 
tests as especially sensitive to the types of aggregation bias involved, since the absence 95  Corporate Savings and Shareholder Consumption 
of a corporate veil implies a particular zero restriction for each individual’s consump- 
tion behavior. 
7.  We are grateful to Scott Hoyt for making this table available to us. In principle, 
one would prefer a distribution of corporate wealth by  capital income classes, since 
individuals with low tangible wealth but high labor income would not be in a position 
to sell assets in order to consume. However, this change would probably not alter the 
table’s basic message significantly. 
8.  An  alternative test suggested to us would consider whether responses of  con- 
sumption to unanticipated dividends were zero once unanticipated changes in wealth 
were accounted for. In principle, this test should yield the same results as ours, but it 
has  the  considerable  disadvantage  of  requiring  us  to observe unanticipated  wealth 
changes. (In our specification, this is not needed because observable lagged consump- 
tion is assumed to incorporate all information about wealth.) Otherwise, conditional 
dividend surprises are likely to convey positive information about wealth, and contam- 
inate the test. 
9.  The use of doubly lagged instruments is also appropriate to correct for the pres- 
ence of transitory consumption.  If transitory consumption is white noise, then it will 
also cause differencing to introduce an MA( 1) error component. 
10.  Alternative specifications using an after-tax interest rate yielded virtually iden- 
tical results and are not reported. 
11. This variable is only calculated (and only makes sense) annually, so in quarterly 
regressions the annual value for the corresponding year is used. 
12.  In the regressions presented, the first-stage R2 values for the changes in divi- 
dends are in some cases higher than those for other forms of disposable income. For 
example, in eq. (7) of table 3.2, the R2  is .06 for labor income, .05 for nondividend 
capital income,  and  .13 for dividends.  For eq. (7) of table 3.3, the corresponding 
values are .33, .17, and .28. The annual estimates using doubly lagged instruments 
were similar to those reported  in table 3.3, except for the coefficient on dividends, 
which was slightly negative. The fit of the first-stage regressions using doubly lagged 
instruments  were  quite  poor, however, making the power of our test questionable. 
While aggregation  problems  most definitely still exist when using annual data,  we 
report our estimates using singly lagged variables since these results are moderately 
more favorable to the existence of the corporate veil. 
13. In  this  light,  it should be unsurprising that  application of  the Hayashi-Sims 
(1983) correction for serial correlation also had little impact on our findings. For this 
reason, we do not report them. 
14. We investigated a second alternative explanation for the insignificance, that div- 
idend changes  in  general  might  have little influence on consumption,  by  including 
dividend surprises in the second-stage regression.  We  found the coefficient on unex- 
pected dividends to be positive and significant. 
15. Actually, consumer behavior in such a model would be different in the transition 
years between states, perhaps making a four-state model the proper specification. Un- 
fortunately, the addition of two more states greatly increases the computational burden 
and will be pursued at a later date. 
16.  The basic idea is that the model is simply a mixture of two normal distributions, 
with the relative weight of each depending on all information upon to time T and the 
Markov probabilities.  The algorithm passes through the data, using new information 
to recalculate the weights given each distribution at each time period. 
17.  The interest rate used is the annual average of quarterly three-month Treasury- 
bill rates. 
18. For example, the unconditional probability of being in state 1 is: p21l(p12 + 
p21). See Chiang (1980) for more details. 
19. The differential reported  is the average rate on short-term  commercial  loans 96  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
minus the prime rate, taken from the Federal Reserve Bulletin.  We were unable to 
obtain a full series of  another alternative measure of credit tightness attributable to 
Jaffee (1971). We interpret the relatively low differential during the 1960s credit crisis 
as reflective of the well-known quantity rationing in lending markets that occurred at 
that time, most notable the credit crunch of 1966. In an alternative specification, which 
interacted the differential with income in an Euler equation, we found that the interac- 
tion term had the correct sign but was not significantly different from zero. This is 
perhaps a reflection of the noisiness of the measure during the 1960s. 
20.  This assumes, of course, that they are both the same order of integration. All of 
the variables we use are integrated of the first order, or I(  1). 
21.  Since eqq. (6) and (7) also hold in differences, one might also make inferences 
about the relative  speeds of  adjustment to changes in different forms of  wealth by 
comparing the estimates from the levels regressions to those using differences. Since 
differencing is equivalent to passing the data through a filter that gives little weight to 
the low frequencies in the data, one would interpret the differenced estimates as “short- 
run” coefficients and the levels estimates as the long-run coefficients. However, given 
the errors with which noncorporate assets and, especially, human wealth are computed, 
one would also expect differences to depress the coefficients of the variables. Separat- 
ing these two effects (errors in variables and lagged adjustments) is not a simple task. 
22.  The error correction coefficient can also be interpreted as representing an esti- 
mate of (p - l), where p is the first-order serial correlation coefficient from the levels 
regression. 
23.  The quarterly FOF data were taken from the “Household Net Worth” tables 
published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, March, 1988. 
24.  This value of the discount rate might be slightly lower than the actual rate. 
Increasing  the  discount  rate  translates  into a  slightly higher  coefficient on  human 
wealth in our regression. Following Hayashi (1982), it is possible to construct a model 
to estimate the discount rate of human wealth. Our estimates of Hayashi’s model were 
very unreliable, however, and quite sensitive to the detrending technique and conver- 
gence criterion  used. Because of  this,  we omit reporting of these estimates  in  this 
paper. 
25.  We  start at the later date of 1952 because that year marks the beginning of the 
availability of the quarterly wealth numbers from the FOF tables. 
26.  The choice of the proper test is quite a complicated issue. We use the Durbin- 
Watson test because of its ease of computation and intuitive appeal. The Dickey-Fuller 
and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are also reported. 
27.  The  10% critical  value reported in Engle and Yo0  (1987) for a higher order 
model is .46 for sample size 100. 
28.  For the annual regressions, we also tried including estimates of social security 
wealth, kindly supplied by Selig Lesnoy of  the Social Security Administration. How- 
ever, this variable was computed only through 1974. The resulting reduction in degrees 
of freedom may in part explain the erratic results that followed. 
29.  The  10% critical values in this case are  .83 (Durbin-Watson), 4.42 (Dickey- 
Fuller) and 3.85 (augmented Dickey-Fuller). 
30.  This result  is  consistent  with earlier  findings.  Bean  (1986) reports  similarly 
small estimates of the impact of corporate wealth on consumption. Blinder and Deaton 
(1985) report only an estimate based on total net worth as a measure of wealth. Their 
estimate is approximately equal to our estimated coefficient for noncorporate wealth. 
In an alternative specification (not reported) that excluded human wealth, we obtained 
a slightly higher coefficient (.015) for corporate wealth,  but interpret this simply as 
evidence that the stock market is useful in predicting future labor income. One poten- 
tial explanation of this result in both sets of regressions is that the induced relationship 
between owner-occupied housing and the imputed rent on such housing raises the coef- 97  Corporate Savings and Shareholder Consumption 
ficient on noncorporate assets above its true value. Leaving these two variables out of 
assets and consumption, respectively, actually leads to an increase in the gap between 
the two coefficients on assets. In eq. (3), the coefficient on corporate wealth goes from 
,009 to .010 and that on noncorporate wealth rises from .039 to ,058. 
3 1. Additional evidence on the effects of  income redistribution on aggregate con- 
sumption is supplied in Borooah and Sharpe (1986). 
References 
Auerbach, A. J. 1979. Wealth Maximization and the Cost of Capital. Quarterly Jour- 
nal of  Economics 93 (August): 433-40. 
. 1989. Tax Reform and Adjustment Costs: The Impact on Investment and Mar- 
ket Value. International Economic Review 30:939-62. 
Bean, C. R. 1986. The Estimation of “Surprise” Models and the “Surprise” Consump- 
tion Function. Review of  Economic Studies 53:497-5 16. 
Blinder, A. S., and A. S. Deaton.  1985. The Time Series Consumption Function Re- 
visited. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2,465-5 11. 
Borooah, V.  K., and D. R. Sharpe,  1986. Aggregate Consumption and the Distribu- 
tion of  Income in the United Kingdom: An Econometric Analysis. Economic Jour- 
nal. 96:449-66. 
Brinner, Roger,  and Jesse Abraham.  1986. Tax Reform  Requires Gramm-Rudman- 
Hollings. Data Resources US.  Review (September): 12-19. 
Campbell, J. Y.,  and N. G. Mankiw. 1987. Permanent Income, Current Income and 
Consumption. NBER Working Paper no. 2436. Cambridge, Mass. 
Chiang, C. L. 1980. An Introduction to Stochastic Processes and Their Applications. 
New York: Krieger. 
Coslett, S. R., and L. F. Lee.  1985. Serial Correlation in Discrete Variable Models. 
Journal of  Econometrics 27:79-97. 
Denison, E. F.  1958. A Note on Private Saving. Review of  Economics and Statistics 
40:761-67. 
Drobny, A., and S. G. Hall.  1987. An  Investigation of the Long Run Properties of 
Aggregate  Non-durable  Consumers’  Expenditure  in  the  UK.  Bank  of  England. 
Mimeograph. 
Engle, R. F., and C. W.  J. Granger. 1987. Co-integration and Error-Correction: Rep- 
resentation, Estimation and Testing. Econometrica 55 (March):25 1-76. 
Engle, R. F., and B. S.  Yoo. 1987. Forecasting and Testing in Co-integrated Systems. 
Journal of  Econometrics 35: 143-60. 
Feldstein, M. S. 1973. Tax Incentives, Corporate Saving and Capital Accumulation in 
the United States. Journal of  Public Economics 2, no. 2 (April): 159-7 1. 
Flavin, M. A. 1981. The Adjustment of Consumption to Changing Expectations about 
Future Income. Journal of  Political Economy 89, no. 5 (Octobe.r):974-1009. 
Goldfeld, S. M., and R.  E. Quandt.  1973. A Markov Model for Switching Regres- 
sions. Journal of  Econometrics  1:2-16. 
Grossman, S. J., and R. J. Shiller. 1981. The Determinants of the Variability of Stock 
Market Prices. American Economic Review 71 (May): 222-27. 
Hall, R. E. 1978. Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent  Income Hy- 
pothesis: Theory and Evidence. Journal ofPolitica1 Economy 86 (December):971- 
87. 
. 1988. Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption. Journal of  Political Econ- 
omy 96:339-57. 98  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
Hamilton, J. D., 1989. A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonstationary 
Time Series and the Business Cycle. Econometrica 57(March): 357-84. 
Hansen, L., and K. Singleton. 1983. Stochastic Consumption, Risk Aversion, and the 
Temporal Behavior of Asset Returns. Journal of Political Economy 91 (April):249- 
65. 
Hayashi, F.  1982. The Permanent Income Hypothesis: Estimating and Testing by In- 
strumental Variables. Journal of Political Economy 90 (October):895-916. 
Hayashi, F., and C. Sims.  1983. Nearly Efficient Estimation of Time Series Models 
with Predetermined, but Not Exogenous, Instruments. Econornetrica 51:783-98. 
Hendershott,  P., and J. Peck,  1987. Private Saving in the US., 1950-1985.  NBER 
Working Paper no. 2294. Cambridge, Mass. 
Hoyt, S. 1988. Wealth Accumulation in the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances. Doc- 
toral diss., University of Pennsylvania. 
Jaffee, D. M. 1971. Credit Rationing and the Commercial Loan Market. New York: 
Wiley. 
Miller, M., and F. Modigliani.  1961. Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of 
Shares. Journal of Business 34:411-33. 
Modigliani,  F.,  and M. Miller.  1958. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and 
the Theory of Investment. American Economic Review 48:261-97. 
Neftci, S. N.  1984. Are Economic Time Series Asymmetric over the Business Cycle? 
Journal of Political Economy 92: 307-28. 
Phillips, P.  C. B. 1986. Understanding Spurious Regressions in Econometrics. Jour- 
nal of Econometrics 33:311-40. 
Poterba, J. M.  1987. Tax Policy and Corporate Savings. Brookings Papers on Eco- 
nomic Activity, no. 2,455-503. 
Sargan, J. D., and A. Bhargava. 1983. Testing Residuals from Least Squares Regres- 
sion for Being Generated by a Gaussian Random Walk. Econometrics 51:153-74. 
U.S.  House of  Representatives.  1986. Tax Reform of  1986. Conference Report no. 
99-841,  vol. 2, table Al.  Washington, D.C., September 18. 
von Furstenburg, G., M.  1981. Saving. In How Taxes Affect EconornicBehavior,  ed. 
H. Aaron and J. Pechman, 327-90.  Washington, D.C.: Brookings. 
Working, Holbrook. 1960. Note on the Correlation of First Differences of Averages in 
a Random Chain. Econometrica 28:916-18. 
Comment  Angus S. Deaton 
It is a pleasure to be asked to discuss a paper such as this in which there is a 
real possibility of using econometric analysis to discover something that is of 
great significance for economic policy. Auerbach and Hassett quote the Data 
Resources, Inc. (DRI) prediction that the recent tax changes will reduce pri- 
vate savings by $19 billion, and, although none of us is very likely to accept 
that estimate, even a much smaller effect would indicate that this is an area 
where tax policy can have a dramatic effect on saving. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine any other way in which apparently minor tax changes could be used 
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to have such a large influence on saving and, presumably, capital formation. 
Unlike many other questions of equal policy import, this also seems to be one 
where we  should have at least a fair chance of  discovering something. The 
theoretical framework is clear and there are plenty of data. And there are also 
“the modem theory of  the consumer” and “recent advances in  time-series 
econometrics” waiting to be applied to give us clearer answers than ever be- 
fore. I think that this paper does indeed take us  further than we  have been 
before, although it also leaves a number of problems and puzzles. 
In the first part of  the paper, that is “the modem theory of  consumption” 
part, the authors use an Euler equation approach to derive a relationship be- 
tween changes in consumption and the real interest rate, to which they pro- 
pose to add anticipated changes in dividends. I think the Euler equation can 
be safely ignored. First, the relationship (1) is not an Euler equation and can- 
not be derived from one without ignoring important terms. Second, the au- 
thors use a pretax real interest rate, whereas the correct posttax rate behaves 
very differently. But of  course we know that none of  this is going to work 
whether it is done correctly or not; there simply is no relationship in the time- 
series data between changes in consumption and the real interest rate. The 
approach here is much more closely related to the literature following Flavin, 
who found that lagged income was correlated with the change in income, a 
result that has been widely ascribed to the presence of borrowing constraints 
for at least a fraction of the population. Auerbach and Hassett set out to show 
that this effect is not due to dividends. If it were, so that additional dividends 
significantly relaxed liquidity constraints, then changes in tax policy that dis- 
couraged retentions in favor of  dividends could certainly decrease private 
saving. 
The paper does not find any such effects. I believe the result, although the 
evidence  in the paper  is not  overwhelmingly convincing.  The problem  is 
largely econometric. In order to avoid time-aggregation effects, only instru- 
ments lagged two periods or more are used in the regressions, but, for many 
of the variables, such instruments have only very poor explanatory power. In 
consequence the standard errors are large, so that in the conclusion that antic- 
ipated dividends do not significantly affect changes in consumption, it is the 
word “significantly” that ought to be emphasized, not the words “do not.” 
While it is true that the significance of the income term survives the instru- 
mentation, it is a good deal larger to start with, larger than we would expect 
the dividend term to be, even if we accepted some part of the DRI view, that 
dividends get spent. 
Even so, it is implausible that many dividend recipients are liquidity con- 
strained. Note that liquidity constraints are likely to be binding for those who 
have low nonhuman wealth and current labor income relative to their future 
anticipated labor income or inheritances, and such people are not exclusively 
poor. In consequence, table 3.1, on the fractions of wealth held by  income 
groups, is not quite what we want, but I do not believe that the true picture 100  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
would be very different. Of course, we do not really know that the sensitivity 
of consumption to anticipated income comes from liquidity constraints rather 
than something else. In the next part of the paper, Auerbach and Hassett but- 
tress the liquidity story, and thus the implausibility of dividends affecting con- 
sumption. I have few quarrels with the modeling here, although it seems to 
me to make more sense to think of their probability that the economy is in a 
credit crisis as reflecting the proportion of consumers in the economy who are 
unable to borrow as much as they would like. Such a reinterpretation may 
require some reformulation, but I doubt that it would be very difficult to do 
so. The evidence in table 3.5, associating high probabilities of credit crisis 
with high real interest rates, is less strong than one would like. Indeed, if there 
really is such an effect, it should have been included in the model that was 
estimated. 
In the last part of the paper, we come to the “recent advances in time-series 
econometrics.” In  particular,  a  good deal  of  attention is paid  to the  con- 
sequences of  regression analysis when  some  or all  of  the  right-hand-side 
variables are integrated processes. Although the regressions here look very 
similar to those that have often been run to test the corporate veil, the interpre- 
tations are different, and a good deal of necessary (and welcome) attention is 
paid to whether and when it is correct to use the OLS standard errors for 
inference. As Auerbach and Hassett note, the very low Durbin-Watson statis- 
tic when consumption is regressed on human wealth, noncorporate and cor- 
porate wealth, can be taken as evidence that the variables are not cointegrated, 
and though the introduction of income and dividends improves the cointegra- 
tion tests, the distribution of the test statistics is still nonstandard, so that it is 
hard to infer much from these results. Instead, they focus attention on a first- 
difference specification with the induced moving average errors dealt with by 
inclusion of  the lagged errors from the levels regression. Although the rapid 
convergence of the parameter estimates in the cointegrated regression implies 
that this two-stage procedure is asymptotically valid, recent Monte Car10 evi- 
dence suggests that there may still be problems in samples of the size used 
here. 
But econometrics apart, the most surprising feature of these final results is 
that there is no apparent effect of  corporate wealth on consumption. In  the 
paper that Alan Blinder and I wrote for Brookings,’ almost the only robust 
result was the effect of unanticipated changes in stock market wealth, and we 
did not think we were discovering anything that has not been found by many 
others over  many  years.  Indeed,  Hall’s  original rejection of  the “random 
walk” consumption function concerned the influence of (lagged) stock market 
wealth on consumption, and others have replicated this result. Why then are 
1. See A. S. Blinder and A. S. Deaton, “The Time Series Consumption Function Revisited’ 
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the results of this paper so different? This seems like an important and urgent 
task for research. 
If I put all three parts of the paper together, I find that there are results that 
I believe, and results of  which I remain skeptical, at least for the time being. 
But there also remain some real problems in reconciling the results with any 
coherent story of the way in which changes in corporate wealth get through to 
households. I am prepared to believe that anticipated changes in dividends do 
not  affect consumption,  and  I am prepared to believe that  the anticipated 
changes in income that do affect consumption have nothing to do with divi- 
dends. But the last negative, that the stock market has no effect on consump- 
tion, is hard to swallow, partly because of previous evidence that it does, but 
also because it removes any link between corporate wealth and its owners. It 
is possible that stockholders do not accept the stock market’s valhation as an 
accurate measure of  corporate wealth, but if  not, they must use some other 
measure, which, if  we  could identify, would affect consumption levels. We 
know it cannot be dividends, so what is it? In not providing an answer, the 
paper leaves us with as many puzzles as it resolves. This Page Intentionally Left Blank